This paper generalizes a result by Samet concerning iterated expectations and common priors. When a player in some state of the world is allowed to ascribe probability zero to that state, something not allowed in Samet's framework, iterated expectations may not converge, and when they do, common knowledge of their limit may not characterize a common prior. It is shown here that replacing common knowledge with common belief, convergence is still lost in general, but when it obtains, the full characterization is restored.
Introduction
In interactive contexts where a player forms different expectations about random variables at different states of the world, her beliefs are themselves random variables. For a given random variable, we are thus naturally led to analyze a player's infinite hierarchy of expectations of random variables, expectations of other players' expectations of random variables, and so on. Samet (1998) uses the Markovian structure of type functions to characterize existence and uniqueness of a common prior, and when a unique common prior exists, to meaningfully construct it in terms of players' expectations only. The main results in Samet (1998) are as follows: first, if for a given random variable and a given sequence of players i 1 , i 2 , . . . where each player appears infinitely often we could compute, at each state, i 1 's expectation of it, i 2 's expectation of i 1 's expectation of it, and so on, then we would end up with a number whose value is common knowledge among the players in every state. Second, there is a common prior if and only if, for every random variable, the limit is the same regardless of what sequence of players we choose.
These results hold under the assumption that every player, at every state, must assign positive probability to that state. While this is not a very restrictive assumption, it is interesting to investigate the effects of relaxing it, and this is what this work does. In Samet (1998) it is suggested that analogous results are true once we replace the notion of common knowledge with that of common 1-belief (as defined by Monderer and Samet (1989) ). Our results show that the second result indeed holds in our more general framework, while the first one (in particular, convergence of iterated expectations to values which are common knowledge at every state, even if a common prior doesn't exist) cannot be proved.
Common Beliefs and Common Priors
We take as given a type space I, Ω, (Π i , t i ) i∈I , where I = {1, . . . , I} is a finite set of players; Ω is a finite set whose elements we call states and whose subsets we call events; Π i is player i's information partition, a partition of Ω whose unique element containing ω we denote by Π i (ω); t i is player i's type function: for each ω ∈ Ω, t i (ω)(·) is a probability measure on (Ω, 2 Ω ) satisfying
An event E is common knowledge 1 at ω if it includes an event which contains ω and is a union of elements of Π i for every i. An event E is evident 1-belief if t i (ω)(E) = 1 for every i ∈ I and every ω ∈ E. Finally, an event E is common 1-belief at ω if there exists an evident 1-belief event F such that ω ∈ F and t i (ω )(E) = 1 for every i ∈ I and every ω ∈ F .
We denote by B the set of nonempty minimal evident 1-belief events. These are thus the nonempty minimal events B which are commonly 1-believed at every ω ∈ B. These events are disjoint. In fact, if B, C ∈ B and B ∩ C = ∅,
hence by minimality of B and C, B = C. It follows that Ω can be uniquely partitioned as
for some finite number k, where B 1 , . . . , B k ∈ B and N is such that t i (ω)(N ) = 0 for every i ∈ I, B ∈ B, ω ∈ B. Note that N can't contain any evident 1-belief event.
A probability measure p on Ω is a common prior, provided
for all i ∈ I, E ⊂ Ω and ω ∈ Ω. Similarly, for B ∈ B, a probability measure p B on B is a common prior on B if for all i ∈ I, E ⊂ Ω and ω ∈ B,
Proof. Suppose S := {ω ∈ N | p(ω) > 0} is nonempty, and let ω ∈ S and i ∈ I. By (4) and (2) above, t i (ω )(ω) > 0 for each ω ∈ Π i (ω). But, by (3) and by definition of B, for every B ∈ B and every ω ∈ B we have t i (ω )(ω) = 0, because ω ∈ N . It follows that Π i (ω) ∩ B = ∅ and thus, again by (3), Π i (ω) ⊂ N , which implies by (1) that t i (ω)(S) = 1. But this is true for every i ∈ I, meaning that S is evident 1-belief, a contradiction.
, hence t i (ω)(S) = 1, for every i ∈ I and every ω ∈ S. In other words, S is a nonempty, evident 1-belief event which is contained in B, and since B is minimal for this property, we conclude that B = S.
Proposition 1. The set of common priors is the convex hull of the set of common priors on the elements of B.
Proof. Suppose p B is a common prior on B ∈ B, and define the probability measure p on Ω as p(E) = p B (B ∩E) for every event E. If ω ∈ B we see that (4) is obviously satisfied. The same is clearly true if ω / ∈ B and p
4) holds for ω , and since Π i (ω) = Π i (ω ), hence t i (ω)(E) = t i (ω )(E), (4) also holds for ω.
Conversely, suppose p is a common prior. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists B ∈ B such that p(B) > 0. Let ω ∈ B and ω ∈ Π i (ω). Since B is evident 1-belief, p(ω ) > 0 clearly implies ω ∈ B, hence we see that p(B ∩ Π i (ω)) = p(Π i (ω)). In other words, the probability measure p B on B defined by p
B (E ∩ B) = p(E ∩ B)/p(B) for every event E satisfies (5).
From now on we assume that Ω = B ∪ N , i.e. we assume that B contains only one element. Proposition 1 ensures this is meaningful, and together with Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it implies that the support of any common prior must be exactly B. But, as Samet (1998) notes, defining for every player i ∈ I the stochastic matrix M i as M i (ω, ω ) = t i (ω)(ω ) for every ω, ω ∈ Ω, a probability measure p on Ω is a common prior if and only if it is a stationary probability measure of M i , that is pM i = p, for every i ∈ I. We conclude by Lemma 2 that, whenever a common prior exists, B is an ergodic set of states for each Markov chain M i , hence in particular that the common prior is unique.
Iterated Expectations
For a random variable f : Ω → R and an infinite sequence i 1 , i 2 , . . . in I where each player appears infinitely often, the corresponding iterated expectation is the sequence of random variables
Divergent Expectations and Common Knowledge
In our framework, the main result in Samet (1998) , which enables a full characterization of existence and uniqueness of a common prior, and a meaningful construction of it (when it uniquely exists) in terms of players' beliefs, need not hold even in simple cases. As an example, let I = {1, 2}, Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }, Π 1 = {{ω 1 , ω 2 }, {ω 3 }} and Π 2 = {{ω 1 }, {ω 2 , ω 3 }}, and let the type functions of 1 and 2 be represented by
The only event which is common knowledge at any state is Ω itself. However, despite the existence of many common priors (any convex combination of [1 0 0] and [0 0 1]), for a random variable f = [f 1 f 2 f 3 ] such that f 1 = f 3 we see that no iterated expectation of it can converge to a value which is common knowledge at any state, because it takes both values M 1 f and M 2 f infinitely often, and the two are different since f 1 = f 3 .
Divergent Expectations and Common 1-Belief
As a preliminary result (which is important in its own right) Samet (1998) proves that, under the assumption that t i (ω)(ω) > 0 for every i ∈ I, ω ∈ Ω, every iterated expectation converges to a value which is common knowledge in every state. Here an analogous claim, in terms of common 1-belief, fails to be true, as the following example shows. 
(taken as a column vector) we see that the iterated expectation
doesn't converge, because it takes both values M 1 f and M 2 f infinitely often. And since B = {Ω}, in no state it is common 1-belief that the iterated expectation converges.
Convergent Expectations
The second result in Samet (1998) , according to which a common prior exists if and only if, for every random variable, every iterated expectation converges to the same value, and this value is common knowledge, can be proved here once we replace common knowledge with common 1-belief (with convergence obtaining almost surely with respect to the common prior).
As said earlier, there's no loss of generality in assuming t i (ω)(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ B and all i ∈ I, since we already proved that otherwise a common prior doesn't exist. On the other hand this is all we need to prove our main result. M σ(I) to B is ergodic, so sufficiency follows immediately from Theorem 1' in Samet (1998) . Conversely, suppose p is a common prior. Then, by Proposition 1, the restriction of p to B is the unique common prior on B, and convergence follows immediately by Theorem 1 in Samet (1998) .
